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To explain cross-country income differences, research has recently focused on the so-called 
deep determinants of economic development, notably institutions and geography. This paper 
sheds a different light on these determinants. We use spatial econometrics to analyse the 
importance of the geography of institutions. We show that it is not only absolute geography, 
in terms of for instance climate, but also relative geography, the spatial linkages between 
countries, that matters for a country’s gdp per capita. Apart from a country’s own institutions, 
institutions in neighboring countries turn out to be relevant as well. This finding is robust to 
various alternative specifications. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The question why we observe such large income differences between countries is arguably the 
most important question in economics. Lately, research on this issue has focused on the so-
called deep or fundamental determinants of economic development. Three determinants have 
been singled out, institutions, geography, and economic integration (openness). Papers by 
inter alia Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu, Robinson and Johnson (2001), Easterly and 
Levine (2003) and Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004) present strong, though not 
undisputed, empirical evidence in favour of institutions over geography and openness. Or in 
the words of Rodrik et al. (2004): institutions rule! Openness is deemed irrelevant and 
geography has at most an indirect impact, via institutions, on per capita income levels. The 
goal of the present paper is to extend this line of research by allowing geography to play a 
different role. Instead of defining a country’s geography only in absolute terms, that is 
independent from the location and characteristics of other countries, we also look upon 
geography in relative terms. The latter implies that a country ´s prosperity is not only a 
function of its own deep determinants but potentially also of these determinants in other 
countries.  
 
Instead of merely analysing whether or not a country is better off if surrounded by high-
income neighbors (see e.g. Redding and Venables, 2004 and Easterly and Levine, 1998), we 
take the observation that institutions rule as our starting point and show that it is the 
geography of institutions that matters. The institutions of other (neighboring) countries exert a 
significant impact on a country’s own gdp per capita. This is the main finding of our paper 
and we show that it is robust to alternative measures of geography, alternative samples and a 
varying list of controls. The second contribution of this paper is that we use spatial 
econometrics to analyse the geography of institutions and other spatial variables, like spatial 
gdp. In our view, spatial econometrics is a useful tool in the IV-setting that characterises the 
new or, if one likes, deep growth empirics.                  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the recent literature on the 
relevance of the so-called deep determinants of economic development, notably institutions 
and geography, and it motivates our choice to look at the spatial or geographical nature of 
institutions. In section 3 we present our data set along with some descriptive statistics and we   3
also introduce our main specification and the spatial econometrics involved in the estimation 
process. Section 4 discusses the estimation results. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.   The Deep Determinants of Income and the Role of Geography 
Income differences between countries are large and persistent. To explain these differences, 
economists have traditionally called upon growth theory and have used growth regressions 
where factor inputs and factor productivities are the prime explanatory variables. As Rodrik et 
al. (2004, pp. 132-133) emphasize, the basic problem with this standard approach is that it is 
merely concerned with the proximate causes of economic growth. If it is for instance found 
that income differences are due to differences in labour productivity, this is begging the 
question what drives the latter. To explain income differences, we therefore need to 
understand the deep or fundamental determinants of economic growth. In the recent empirical 
literature on the fundamental causes of income or growth differences, three deep determinants 
have in particular been emphasized: institutions, geography and economic integration. A main 
stimulus for what might be called the new growth empirics is the use of instruments that deal 
with the endogeneity issue. To be able to conclude that cross-country variations in these kind 
of deep determinants “cause” the observed cross-country income differences, one wants to 
exclude the feedback from income or a third variable of interest. Since geography is meant to 
refer to physical geography only, the exogeneity of this determinant is commonly taken for 
granted. This is however not true for institutions or economic integration (openness) and it is 
here that the introduction of new instruments has been important. Following the work of 
notably Acemoglu et al. (2001), Hall and Jones (1999) and Frankel and Romer (1999), the 
issue of the instrumentation of respectively institutions and economic integration can be dealt 
with. Even though there are differences in the specifications used and in the deep 
determinants actually included in the analysis (any combination of institutions, geography or 
integration can be found in the literature), the main conclusion is that institutions have a 
strong and direct impact on income, that geography is at best only of indirect importance to 
explain income differences (via its impact on institutions), and that economic integration, 
when set against institutions and geography, does not have a significant impact on income. 
This consensus view is best exemplified by the seminal paper by Rodrik et al. (2004) that will 
therefore serve as a benchmark for our own analysis.  
 
The methodology used and the conclusions reached by Rodrik et al. (2004) and other related 
papers have, however, not remained unchallenged. Sachs (2003) for instance strongly disputes   4
the alleged irrelevance of physical geography and attempts to show that alternative measures 
of geography (i.e. tropical disease indicators) indicate that geography is as important as 
institutions. Glaeser et al. (2004) argue that institutions are poorly measured and identified in 
the new growth empirics and once this is acknowledged, other and more standard 
determinants (human capital) are far more important in explaining differences in economic 
prosperity. As to the conclusion that economic integration or openness is not important, 
Alcala and Ciccone (2004) for instance use an alternative measure of openness and then show 
that openness is very significant in explaining cross-country differences in productivity.
2  
 
In our view, the new or deep growth empirics can, however, be criticized for a different and 
more fundamental reason. Our criticism deals not with the exact definitions of the three deep 
determinants of income in Rodrik et al. (2004), our concern is first and foremost with the 
limited role that second nature geography or space plays in the analysis. Following a 
distinction made by Krugman (1993), the current literature only looks at the role of first 
nature or absolute geography (e.g. looking at the impact of variables such as distance to the 
equator, climate, or disease environment) in explaining cross-country income differences. 
Second nature geography does not play a part at all. As a result, the relative geography of a 
country, i.e. the location of a country vis-à-vis other countries (in our view also clearly a deep 
determinant) is no issue. This neglect not only holds for economic interdependencies but also 
for political and, most relevant here, institutional interdependencies that may exist between 
(neighboring) countries. It is only differences in absolute geography between otherwise 
spatially independent countries that matter. So, for the income of country j only the geography 
in terms of its own climate or its access to the sea is thought to be important but not whether 
or not this country is surrounded by countries with a high income level and/or good 
institutions nor whether or not it located near large markets and/or its main suppliers.  
 
The idea that second nature geography is relevant has already been given some attention in 
the literature. It lies at the heart of for instance the so-called new economic geography 
approach (Fujita et al., 1999). In a nutshell and when applied to this paper’s topic, this 
approach argues that a country’s income is higher if this country is located close to other 
high-income countries. Papers by Crafts and Venables (2001) and Redding and Venables 
                                                 
2 See section 2.3 in Rodrik et al (2004) for a reaction to Sachs (2003) and Alcala and Ciccone (2004). Another 
recent critique, see for instance Rajan and Zingales (2006), is whether institutions can really be considered to be 
deep determinants to begin with.   5
(2004) provide empirical evidence that this indeed seems to be the case (see also section 4.3 
below).  This paper takes a somewhat different approach. Given the aforementioned 
consensus in the literature, we include the institutions of neighboring countries.  More in 
particular, we want to find out if the geography of institutions matters to understand cross-
country income differences. Several authors have discussed channels (see also Table 8 below) 
through which the institutional setup in neighboring countries may be of importance. Easterly 
and Levine (1998) show that the poor economic performance of one country (as a result of for 
instance bad policy) negatively affects income levels in its neighboring countries. Ades and 
Chua (1997) provide evidence that instability in neighboring countries (measured by the 
number of revolutions and coups) has a negative effect on the economic performance of a 
country itself. Regional instability disrupts trade, especially for landlocked countries that are 
depending on trade routes (access to the sea) through neighboring territory. It also results in 
increased military expenditures to prevent spreading of conflict and/or to deter potential 
future military aggression from unstable neighbors (thereby crowding out productive 
investment by the government). In a similar vein, Murdoch and Sandler (2002) argue that 
civil war in neighboring countries disrupts economic activity at home. Finally, Simmons and 
Elkins (2004) show that countries copy (avoid) policies (be it bad or good) from other 
(neighboring) countries that were proven (un)succesful or that countries are forced to adopt 
similar policies as those in other countries in order to stay economically competitive or in 
order to comply to regional or global pressures.   
                                     
3.  Model Specification, Data Set and Estimation Strategy 
3.1 Model Specification 
Following the exposition in Rodrik et al. (2004) the benchmark empirical specification of this 





yG e o I n s t ii





        ( 1 )  
where yi is the natural logarithm of income per capita in country i, Insti and Geoi are measures 
for institutions and geography respectively, and εi is a random error term. Furthermore Zi is a 
vector (or vectors) of variables used to instrument the measure for institutions to correct for 
potential reverse causality (higher income results in better institutions), omitted variables or 
measurement error. Rodrik et al. (2004) use, following Acemoglu et al. (2001), European 
settler mortality as only instrument for their baseline sample. Given the resulting limitation 
that this imposes on the number of countries (79 former colonies) that can be included in the   6
analysis, they also resort to the use of two other instruments, introduced by Hall and Jones 
(1999), i.e. % population speaking English and % population speaking a European language, 
and consider a much larger sample of 137 countries
3. 
 
To incorporate the main point of this paper in the empirical specification, we add a term 
capturing the quality of institutions of one’s neighbors to equation (1): 
() )
)
ii i i i
ii i i
y Geo Inst W Inst ii
Inst Z Geo i
α βγλ ε
µφ δ η
=+ + + +
=+ + +
      ( 2 )  
where (W Inst)i is a measure of the average quality of institutions in country i‘s neighboring 
countries. More formally this measure is constructed by matrix multiplication of the so-called 
spatial weights matrix, W, with the vector of own country institutions, Inst. Equation (2) 
captures the main idea of this paper quite clearly. An institutional change in country i not only 
has an effect on the economic prosperity of country i itself ( / ii y Inst γ ∂ ∂= ) but also on that of 
its neighbors ( / ji j i yI n s t w λ ∂∂ = ).  
 











     (3) 
where n is the total number of neighbors of country i (islands are assigned their nearest 
neighbor in terms of distance between capital cities as being their only contiguous neighbor).  
We have decided to use this simple contiguity based weighting matrix, which gives equal 
weight to all neighbors, as our baseline specification (also used by Ades and Chua, 1997). 
Other weighting schemes have been used in the literature on spillovers between neighboring 
countries however, for example weighting each neighbor by the size of its total GDP (Easterly 
and Levine, 1998), weighting each neighbor by the length of the common border (Murdoch 
and Sandler, 2002) or by considering the n-nearest countries as being neighbors. We use the 
simple spatial weight matrix in (3) in our baseline specification
4 as we think it captures in a 
clean and simple way the main point that we want to make in this paper, namely that 2
nd 
                                                 
3 The use of these two instruments for their largest sample is not without problems, see Appendix B. 
4 In section 4.2 we assess the robustness of our results by using alternative spatial weight matrices. Note also that 
the use of GDP weights is likely to result in an endogenous spatial weight matrix, making inference problematic 
(see Anselin, 1988).   7
nature or relative geography matters
5. As in equation (1), institutions need to be instrumented 
as well in order to resolve potential endogeneity problems, see section 3.3 below. 
 
3.2 The Data Set 
Regarding the choice of variables for institutions and geography we also follow Rodrik et al. 
(2004) by taking the Rule of Law variable due to Kaufmann et al. (2005)
6 as our baseline 
institutional measure and the absolute distance from the equator in degrees as our baseline 
geography measure. As dependent variable we collected GDP per capita (PPP adjusted) in 
1995 from the 2003 version of the World Development Indicators.  
 
Figure 1 The spatial distribution of (a) GDP per capita and (b) Institutions (Rule of Law) 
  
Notes: Top panel: GDP per capita in 1995 from high (darkest) to low (lightest); Bottom panel: Institutions (Rule of Law) in 2000 from 
best (darkest) to worst (lightest). Countries with no data available are dotted. 
                                                 
5 We do not see a clearcut reason to, a priori, give more weight to for example larger neighbors (even less so in 
terms of their GDP) when considering the possible spillovers from bad or good institutions. Spillovers from bad 
institutions in a small neighboring country may have just as large an effect on one’s own country as those from 
larger neighboring countries (e.g. civil unrest from Burundi (a small country) spilling over to Rwanda (also a 
small country) and affecting Uganda, the Dem. Rep. of Congo and Tanzania (all larger countries). 
6 Note that we have taken the Rule of Law variable from the most recent version of the Kaufmann et al. 
indicators as they are supposed to supersede (see http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata/index.html) the 
older version(s).   8
 
To give an idea of the spatial distribution of both GDP per capita and institutions, Figures 1a 
and 1b show the distributions of these two variables across the countries in our dataset. As can 
be seen both income per capita and the quality of institutions are not randomly distributed 
across the globe. Instead, relatively high (low) levels of income per capita are geographically 
clustered in the Americas and Europe (Africa and Asia) and clusters of relatively good (bad) 
institutions are located in North America, Europe and the southern tip of Africa and South 
America (Africa, Middle- and South America and part of the Middle-East). Whereas the 
current literature implicitly explains this clustering of similar income levels by country-
specific differences in e.g. 1
st nature geography and institutions, this paper looks whether or 
not this spatial pattern of institutions also contributes to the observed income differences. 
 
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics for the main variables of interest 
Number of countries in the sample: 147 
   GDP per capita in 1995 (PPP adjusted) Geography Institutions  Neighboring  institutions
Mean I$  7518  (mean log y: 8.34) 22.67  0.12  0.02 
Standard deviation  I$ 7230    (s.d. log y: 1.15) 15.52  1.03  0.92 
Min  I$ 450  (Tanzania)  0.23 (Uganda) -1.86 (Dem. Rep. Congo)  -1.72 (Seychelles) 
Max  I$ 33256 (Luxembourg)  63.89 (Iceland) 2.20 (Switzerland)  2.05 (Sweden) 
Notes: The institutional measure, Rule of Law in 2000, ranges from –2.50 (worst) to +2.50 (best). Neighboring institutions  
is constructed as in (3) using the contiguity-based spatial weight matrix with islands being assigned their nearest neighbor  
(based on distance between capital cities) as only (artificial) contiguous neighbor. I$ stands for international dollar and the geography 
measure is by the degrees of latitude belonging to a country’s centroid. See Appendix A for a complete description of the data set. 
 
Table 1 provides some additional descriptives. The countries in our sample have an average 
GDP per capita of I$ 7518 with a large variation across countries (s.d. of I$ 7230); ranging 
from I$ 450 per capita in the poorest country (Tanzania) to I$ 33256 per capita in the richest 
country (Luxembourg). The typical country is located at 22.67 degrees above or below the 
equator with Uganda the closest and Iceland (that is their respective centroid) the furthest 
away from the equator. Regarding the institutional quality measure, Table 2 and Figure 2 give 
some more detail about both the institutional and the neighboring institutional qualities. 
 




Neighboring Institutions  Relatively Bad Neighbors  Relatively Good Neighbors 
Dem. Rep. Congo  Seychelles (Isl)  Hong Kong (China)  Philippines (Isl -> Hong Kong) 
Somalia  Dominican Republic  Kuwait (Iraq, Saudi Arabia)  Yemen (Oman, Saudi Arabia) 
Liberia  Jamaica (Isl)  Chile (Bolivia, Peru, Argentina)  Iraq (Kuwait, Iran, Jordan) 
Iraq  Sierra Leone  Singapore (Malaysia)  Haiti (Dominican Republic) 
Haiti  Central African Rep.  Mauritius (Isl -> Madagascar)  Poland (Germany) 
Notes: The institutional measure, Rule of Law in 2000, ranges from –2.50 (worst) to +2.50 (best). Neighboring institutions is  
constructed as in (3) using the contiguity-based spatial weight matrix with islands being assigned their nearest neighbor (based on 
distance between capital cities) as only (artificial) contiguous neighbor. Relatively bad (good) neighbors is calculated as own minus 
neighboring institutions with case own institutions < 0 (>0). Isl stands for island.   9
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Rule of Law - Linear prediction
 
Notes: The institutional measure, Rule of Law in 2000, ranges from –2.50 (worst) to +2.50 (best). The variable neighboring institutions  
is constructed as in (3) using the contiguity-based spatial weight matrix with islands being assigned their nearest neighbor  
(based on distance between capital cities) as only (artificial) contiguous neighbor. The simple pairwise correlation between own 
neighboring institutions is 0.73 [p-value: 0.00] (dotted line). The thick line is the 45
0 degree line. Sample 147 countries. 
 
Figure 2 shows the relationship between own and neighboring institutions (pairwise 
correlation between the two is 0.73 [p-value 0.00]). Countries below (above) the thick 45
0 line 
are countries with better (worse) own institutions than their average neighbor. Table 2 
provides some more detail on this, showing that Hong Kong (the Phillipines) has the best 
(worst) institutions relative to its neighbors followed by Kuwait and Chile (Yemen and Iraq). 
In absolute terms the Seychelles (followed by the Dominican Republic, Jamaica and Sierra 
Leone) have the worst neighbors in terms of institutions whereas the Democratic Republic of 
Congo has the worst own institutions (followed by Somalia, Liberia and Iraq). 
 
Note that our baseline sample consists of 147 countries. Rodrik et al. (2004) use a sample of 
only 79 countries as their baseline sample because they deem settler mortality (taken from 
Acemoglu et al., 2001) to be a ‘better’ instrument (based on the result of overidentification 
tests), than the Hall and Jones (1999) instruments, i.e. % population speaking a European 
language and % population speaking English (see also Acemoglu, 2005)
7. Settler mortality 
rates are, however, only available for 79 countries (former colonies only). Besides the more 
standard argument of improving inference when using more observations (see also McArthur 
and Sachs, 2001), we have a more fundamental reason to use the largest possible sample. 
Given our aim to assess the importance of 2
nd nature or relative geography, more particularly 
                                                 
7 See Appendix B for a detailed discussion of the solution to this problem in case of our 147-country sample.   10
the institutional setting in neighboring countries, we do need to have data available on these 
neighbors! To make our point, Figure 2 shows a map of the countries included in our 147-
country sample and also a map of the 79 countries included in Rodrik et al.’s baseline sample.  
 
Figure 2 Our baseline sample and Rodrik et al (2004) baseline sample 
 
Note: Dark countries are included in the sample. Top panel: our baseline sample for 147 countries; Lower panel: Rodrik et al.’s (2004) 
baseline sample for 79 countries. 
 
From Figure 2 it is immediately clear that the 147 sample adds many countries in Europe, the 
Middle-East, Asia and Africa (still missing in our sample are mainly former communist 
countries). Restricting our analysis to the 79 country sample would lead to a number of 
countries (mainly in Africa and Asia) having far fewer neighbors than they in actual fact have, 
e.g. Angola, Tanzania, Cameroon, India, Vietnam, Laos and Egypt, and even leads to 
‘artificial islands’, i.e. South Africa and Hong Kong. Using the largest possible sample avoids 
or at least limits this problem
8. 
 
                                                 
8 Admittedly, the problem still remains in our sample, but too a much lesser extent (basically only for countries 
bordering a former communist country).   11
3.3 Estimation Strategy 
Given the model specification as given by equation (1), Rodrik et al. (2004) apply a 2SLS 
estimation procedure. Given the fact that the institutional measure is expected to be correlated 
to the error term due to reverse causality, measurement error or omitted variable bias, a simple 
OLS regression on equation (1-ii) would result in biased and inconsistent estimates of all 
parameters of interest. 2SLS solves these problems if a ‘good’ instrument(s)
9 is used for the 
institutional quality measure. In the 1
st stage (1-i), the institutional measure is regressed on the 
instrument(s) and the geography measure (and possible additional controls), and in the 2
nd 
stage (1-ii) the effects of geography and institutions are obtained as the parameters on 
geography and fitted institutions from the 1
st stage, obtained by regressing log GDP per capita 
on the geography measure and the fitted institutions obtained from the 1
st stage (and possible 
additional controls), respectively.  
 
Can one use the same estimation strategy when taking 2
nd nature geography into account by 
also trying to estimate the effect of neighboring countries’ institutions on one’s own GDP per 
capita? And related to this: do we also have to instrument our measure of neighboring 
institutions, and if so how to do this? As mentioned before, the reason to use a 2SLS 
estimation procedure in the standard case, our model (1), is that the institutional quality 
measure is likely to be correlated to the 2
nd stage error term, making OLS a biased and 
inconsistent estimator. More formally, 
(' ) 0 EI n s tε ≠              ( 4 )  
In our case, model (2), the need to instrument own institutions is beyond discusson given the 
importance given to this in the earlier literature, and we do this using the variable % speaking 
a European language as an instrument. See Appendix B for more information on the 
estimation strategy and the choice of instruments. But here we face the additional question 
whether or not we also have to instrument neighboring countries’ institutions. As in the case 
of own institutions, this variable needs to be instrumented if it is suspect to be correlated with 
the error term, i.e. 
(( )' ) 0 EW I n s tε ≠           ( 5 )  
If this is the case, instrumenting only own institutions will result in biased and inconsistent 
estimates not only of the effect of neighboring institutions but of all estimated parameters (so 
                                                 
9 Good meaning 1) significantly related to the institutional quality measure, i.e. significant in the 1
st stage, and 2) 
uncorrelated with the residual in the 2
nd stage. The second requirement can be explained more intuitively by 
saying that the effect the instrument has on GDP per capita goes entirely through its effect on institutional 
quality.   12
also the effect of own institutions and geography). So can we expect neighboring institutions 
to be correlated with the error term? As in case of own institutions there are basically three 
main reasons for this to be the case: reverse causality, measurement error and omitted variable 
bias. Appendix C discusses each of these potential sources of endogeneity of the neighboring 
institutions variable in more detail. Based on the arguments in Appendix C, it is quite likely 
that we do have to instrument our measure of neighboring countries’ institutional quality to 
avoid potential endogeneity bias in our estimates. Having established this need to instrument 
neighboring countries’ institutions, the natural follow-up question is what to use as an 
instrument? Does this require the introduction of a new instrument? As also shown in 
Appendix C, this turns out not to be the case, given that we have a valid instrument for own 
institutions, i.e. % of the population speaking a European language, we can apply the 
following estimation strategy: 
1.  In the 1
st stage regress own institutions on the instrument, geography and 
possible additional controls, (2-i) and obtain the fitted institutions,  ˆ Inst . 
2.  Using the obtained fitted institutions construct also neighboring countries’ 
fitted institutions, i.e.  ˆ WI n st. 
3.  In the 2
nd stage, (2-ii), regress GDP per capita on geography, possible 
additional controls and  ˆ Inst and  ˆ WI n st. Given the validity of the chosen 
instrument, the parameters obtained will be unbiased and consistent estimates 
of the parameters of interest. 
Given the discussion above, all estimation results in the next section are obtained with the 
estimation strategy outlined above.  
 
4. Estimation Results 
4.1 Baseline model 
As we explained in the previous section, our baseline specification closely follows the 
baseline specification in Rodrik et al. (2004) because we basically want to extend their 
analysis by adding spatial institutions. Table 3 presents the estimation results for our baseline 
model. The relevant comparison with the Rodrik et al. (2004) study is their Table 3. The log 
of gdp per capita is thus regressed on the preferred measures for geography, institutions and, 
in our extension, neighbouring institutions. Since a main conclusion from the Rodrik et al. 
(2004) study is that the integration (openness) variable is invariably insignificant, we decided 
to omit that variable and we thereby concentrate on the main issue for the present paper, the   13
relationship between geography (1
st and 2
nd nature) and institutions
10. Columns (1)-(5) 
replicate the findings by Rodrik et al. (2004). Institutions are always very significant. 1
st 
nature geography is significant when included on its own, but ceases to be significant or is 
significant with the wrong (unexpected) sign once we include (instrumented) institutions. It 
seems to be at most of only indirect relevance, given the fact that it is significant in the 1
st 




Table 3 Estimation results for baseline specification 
Baseline 
Dependent variable: log GDP per capita in 1995             
  (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4) 2SLS  (5) 2SLS  (6) OLS  (7) 2SLS 
Geography (distance equator)  4.21   -  0.59   -  -1.76  0.17  -2.45 
  (11.57)   -  (1.55)   -  (-1.94)  (0.41)  (-2.13) 
Institutions (rule of law)   -  0.95  0.88  1.39  1.45  0.81  0.92 
    - (24.75)  (15.39)  (7.10)  (7.07) (11.84) (2.75) 
Neighboring Institutions (rule of law)   -   -   -   -   -  0.19  0.75 
   -   -   -   -   -  (2.17)  (2.69) 
1st stage 
Instrumented  variable  na na na  Institutions Institutions na  Institutions
% speaking european language   -   -   -  0.81  0.70   -  0.70 
   -   -   -  (4.12)  (5.48)   -  (5.48) 
Geography (distance equator)   -   -   -   -  4.01   -  4.01 
   -   -   -   -  (12.72)   -  (12.72) 
            
nr  observations  147  147  147  147 147 147 147 
Notes: t-values in parentheses. 
 
Our principal interest in Table 3 is, however, with columns (6) and (7). Two results stand out. 
First, neighboring institutions matter. Neighboring institutional quality has a significant 
positive effect on economic prosperity. Second, a country’s own institutions continue to be 
relevant but, when including also neighboring institutional quality, the estimated coefficient is 
lower compared to the 2SLS results in column (5). The estimated effect of own institutions is 
however (not unexpectedly) larger than that of neighboring institutions, even more so when 
one keeps in mind that the estimated coefficient on neighboring instutions measures the effect 
of an institutional improvement in all neighboring countries. Combining these two findings 
we thus find that institutions still rule but geography also matters in the sense that the 
                                                 
10 Adding integration (openness) instrumented by the Frankel and Romer (1999) instrument does not change any 
of the results shown in our paper. Furthermore integration is, as in Rodrik et al. (2004), invariably insignificant. 
Results are available upon request. 
11 To arrive at the corresponding coefficients in Table 3 of Rodrik et al. (2004) for the geography (distance to the 
equator) and institutions (rule of law), our estimated coefficients should be multiplied by the standard deviation, 
0.172 and 1.030 for geography and institutions respectively.    14
geography of institutions (here, neighboring institutions) helps to explain income differences 
in our sample of 147 countries. In the remainder of this section we want to find out if this 
main result still holds for alternative measures of spatial institutions, after including regional 
and other fixed effects, for alternative country samples, and, recall section 2, for specifications 
that include a different measures of 2
nd nature geography, namely a country’s market potential 
or market access, among the set of explanatory variables.         
 
4.2  Robustness checks 
As a first robustness check, we estimated our 2SLS baseline model with spatial institutions 
while using alternative spatial measures. Recall that in the baseline model we use contiguity 
but for islands we use the nearest neighbor (determined on the basis of the distance between 
capital cities). Columns (2) and (3) in Table 4 indicate whether our results are sensitive to the 
definition of neighbor for the “island” countries in our sample (obviously, for these countries 
contiguity does not make sense)
 12. In column (2) the reference city, chosen to determine the 
nearest neighbor, is a country’s main city instead of its capital city, and in column (3) an 
island is assigned two (nearest) neighbors instead of one. It is clear that the results do hardly 
change at all.       
 
Table 4 Using alternative spatial measures 
Robustness 1: Different spatial measures 
2SLS, dependent variable: log GDP per capita in 1995 [Instrumented: Institutions (rule of law)] 
  (1) Baseline  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Contiguity (avg 2.9 neighbors)  Nearest neighbor (capital city) area weighted
  capital city  main city  capital city (2) 10  5  (capital city) 
Geography  (distance  equator)  -2.45  -2.46  -2.32 -2.68 -2.51 -1.96 
  (-2.13)  (-2.14)  (-2.35) (-3.11) (-2.82) (-1.93) 
Institutions (rule of law)  0.92  0.93  1.11  1.15  1.14  1.09 
  (2.75)  (2.78)  (4.22) (5.70) (5.34) (4.03) 
Neighboring Institutions (rule of law)  0.75  0.73  0.52  0.65  0.58  0.45 
  (2.69)  (2.65)  (2.33) (4.41) (3.58) (2.12) 
          
nr  observations  147  147  147 147 147 147 
Note: capital city (2), 3
rd column, means islands are contiguous to 2 nearest neighbors (instead of 1). 1
st stage 
results, as in Table 3 column (5) or (7). t-values in parentheses. 
 
When we dismiss contiguity all together and define spatial institutions in terms of nearest 
neighbors for all 147 countries in our sample, columns (4) and (5) of Table 4 give the 
estimation results for various measures of nearest neighbor, where 10 or 5 refers to the 
                                                 
12 Note that the “island” countries in our sample see top panel of Figure 2, are real islands as well as countries 
(like South Korea) that because of lack of data (North Korea is not in our sample) would have no neighbors in 
terms of contiguity.      15
number of neighboring countries that we took into account in the definition of nearest 
neighbor. Invariably, distance to the n-nearest neighbors is measured by the distance between 
the corresponding capital cities. Finally, column (6) shows the results when using an area-
weighted measure of contiguity in order to see whether giving more weight to larger 
neighbors affects the results. As can be seen, the results for the significance of institutions and 
neighboring institutions are not affected. Also, just as with our baseline results in section 4.1, 
1
st nature geography is significant but has the wrong sign.   
 
Another robustness check that is rather straightforward concerns the sample composition. 
Table 5 illustrates for 3 sub-samples of our overall sample of 147 countries whether the main 
results are sensitive to sample selection (again, only the 2
nd stage estimation results are 
shown). In order to avoid loss of information about the neighbors, the neighboring 
institutional variable in these regressions is based on the whole 147-sample. That is to say, 
fitted (neighboring) institutions are obtained from the first stage results using the 147-country 
sample, and next the 2
nd stage is done using a specific subsample. The basic message is that 
the conclusions with respect to our main variables of interest, institutions and neighboring 
institutions, are not affected. Note that when excluding Africa or the Western countries from 
the sample, the significance of neighboring institutions drops slightly compared to the 
baseline sample (to the 5.9% or the 4.9% level respectively), suggesting that it is the variance 
between Africa and the Western countries that contributes to the more significant results in 
the baseline sample (see also Easterly and Levine, 1998 for a similar finding).  
  
Table 5 Changing the sample size 
Robustness 2: sample 
2SLS, dependent variable: log GDP per capita in 1995 [Instrumented: Institutions (rule of law)] 
  (1) Baseline  (2) non West  (3) no Africa  (3) no Islands 
Geography (distance equator)  -2.45  -3.00  -0.96  -3.15 
 (-2.13)  (-2.30)  (-1.08)  (-2.18) 
Institutions (rule of law)  0.92  1.10  0.61  1.06 
 (2.75)  (2.79)  (2.58)  (2.56) 
Neighboring Institutions (rule of law)  0.75  0.61  0.45  0.81 
 (2.69)  (1.89)  (1.97)  (2.45) 
        
nr observations  147  124  118  98 
Notes: non West refers to the sample excluding all Western European countries, the USA,  
Canada, Australia and New Zealand. t-values in parentheses. 1
st stage results, as in Table 3  
column (5) or (7). t-values in parentheses. 
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By far the most important robustness check that we carried out, however, deals with the 
extension of our baseline model by adding additional controls that have been suggested in the 
literature. Since we are using Rodrik et al. (2004) as our benchmark, we based our selection of 
additional explanatory variables largely on the control variables used in that paper (Rodrik et 
al. (2004), Table 6, p. 148). More specifically, see our Table 6 below, we decided to add as 
controls 3 regional dummies, additional measures of 1
st nature geography and the identity of 
the (European) colonizer and religion.  
 
Table 6   1st nature geography, main colonizer identity and religion as controls 
Robustness 3: regional dummies, extra geography, origin of colonizer, religion 
2SLS, dependent variable: log GDP per capita in 1995 [Instrumented: Institutions (rule of law)]   
  (1) Baseline  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8) 
Geography (distance equator)  -2.45  -0.45  -1.52  0.18  -1.75  -2.03  -0.33  -0.48 
  (-2.13)  (-0.64) (-1.54) (0.27) (-1.29) (-1.65)  (-0.40)  (-0.65) 
Institutions  (rule  of  law)  0.92  0.72 0.99 0.69 1.04 0.66  0.80  0.64 
  (2.75)  (6.51) (3.69) (6.49) (2.86) (1.85)  (5.09)  (4.46) 
Neighboring Institutions (rule of law)  0.75  0.35  0.43  0.28  0.56  0.58  0.23  0.30 
(2.69)  (2.60) (2.35) (2.66) (2.66) (2.37)  (2.19)  (2.76) 
Regional  dummies            
Sub-Saharan Africa   -  -0.36   -  -0.21   -   -  -0.41  0.15 
 -  (-1.95)   -  (-1.20)   -   -  (-1.98)  (0.52) 
Latin America + Caribean   -  0.36   -  0.36   -   -  0.22  0.33 
 -  (2.44)   -  (2.51)   -   -  (0.95)  (1.41) 
East-South-East Asia   -  0.09   -  0.16   -   -  0.18  0.20 
 -  (0.51)   -  (1.01)   -   -  (0.97)  (1.21) 
other  Geography             
landlocked   -   -  -0.52  -0.49   -   -  -0.42  -0.46 
   -   -  (-3.64)  (-3.73)   -   -  (-3.29)  (-3.71) 
island   -   -  -0.03  -0.04   -   -  0.11  -0.18 
 -   -  (-0.18)  (-0.39)   -   -  (0.76)  (-1.28) 
area   -   -  0.00  -0.03   -   -  -0.02  -0.02 
 -   -  (0.05)  (-1.14)   -   -  (-0.77)  (-0.55) 
malaria (MALFAL)   -   -   -   -   -  -0.90   -  -1.33 
   -   -   -   -   -  (-2.78)   -  (-1.50) 
%  speaking english   -   -   -   -  -0.44   -  -0.48   - 
   -   -   -   -  (-1.09)   -  (-1.75)   - 
Indentity European colonizer  no  no  no  no  yes  no  yes  no 
%  Religion  no  no no no  yes  no yes no 
             
1st stage 
Instrumented variable:   Institutions  Institutions Institutions Institutions Institutions Institutions Institutions Institutions
%  speaking  european  language  0.70  1.27 0.62 1.30 0.74 0.62  1.06  1.27 
  (5.48)  (7.69) (4.56) (6.85) (4.24) (3.91)  (5.73)  (6.25) 
Geography  (distance  equator)  4.01  3.40 4.14 3.54 3.41 3.98  3.44  3.22 
  (12.72)  (6.98) (14.91) (7.55)  (7.55) (11.18)  (5.45)  (6.41) 
              
nr  observations  147  147 147 147 147 130  147  130 
Notes: The 1
st stage results only show the estimated coefficients on the instrument (% speaking a European 
language) and geography. The 1
st stage coefficients of the other exogenous controls are not shown in order to 
save space. Also the 1
st stage for the malaria variable, instrumented by a measure of malaria ecology, is not 
shown here. t-values in parentheses.   17
 
The reason to add controls like the regional dummies and the other geography variables is that 
we set out to estimate spatial dependence between countries (via our neighboring institutions 
variable) but in Tables 3-5 it could be that the found relevance of spatial dependence is simply 
due to spatial heterogeneity because of omitted variables that are regional in nature like the 
regional dummies and the landlocked or malaria variable. Of these additional control 
variables, three variables in particular have been subject of discussion in the literature because 
of their alleged importance: the Sub-Saharan Africa dummy, the landlocked variable, and 
malaria (see Appendix A for definitions of all included controls). 
 
The estimation results (both the 1
st and 2
nd stage results are shown in Table 6) lead to the 
following conclusions:  
-First, most importantly, our main results carry through. In all specifications, neighboring 
institutions are significant (and 1
st nature geography only has an indirect impact on gdp per 
capita).  
-Second, when comparing our results to the corresponding results in Rodrik et al. (2004), it is 
clear that the coefficient on own-country institutions is much lower in our case. Whereas we 
find a coefficient of approx. 0.7-0.9, in Rodrik et al. (2004) the corresponding coefficient is in 
the range of approximately 1.5-2.5.  
-Third, of the additional controls the landlocked variable seems to be most important in the 
sense that it is significant in all of the specifications shown in Table 6. This is not in line with 
the findings in Rodrik, et al. (2004), where the landlocked variable is not significant. The fact 
that we do find a significantly negative, direct, effect of being landlocked is probably due to 
the larger sample that we use. 13 of the 68 countries that our sample is larger than the baseline 
sample in Rodrik et al. (2004) are actually landlocked (e.g. Malawi, Nepal, Mongolia and 
Zimbabwe, see also Figure 3), allowing us to better pinpoint the effect of being landlocked. 
The Sub-Saharan Africa dummy is not significant once landlocked and/or malaria are also 
added as a controls, see column (4) and (8). Also of interest is the finding, in line with Rodrik 
et al. (2004), that the malaria variable is significant when included on its own (column (6)) 
but this is no longer the case when the regional dummies are added as controls. 
 
4.3  New Economic Geography and Spatial GDP 
In section 2 we referred to the new economic geography literature where income differences 
between countries are explained by the spatial income dependency between countries. It might   18
therefore be argued that the real importance in terms of including 2
nd nature geography is not 
so much spatial institutions but spatial income.  
 
Table 7 Spatial GDP and Spatial Institutions 
Notes: The 1
st stage results only show the estimated coefficients on the instrument (% speaking a European 
language) and geography. The 1
st stage coefficients of the other exogenous controls are not shown in order to 
save some space. Instrument validity for the distance instruments is rejected when including only Market Access 
(Hansen J-statistic: 22.29 [p-value: 0.00]) but accepted when including also geography and (neighboring) 
institutions (Hansen J-statistic: 2.70 [p-value: 0.26]). t-values in parentheses. 
 
Robustness 4: adding Market Access (MA), i.e. spatial GDP 
2SLS, dependent variable: log GDP per capita in 1995 
  (1) Baseline  (2) MA  (3) MA + Institutions  (4) MA + Neigh. Inst.   (5) + extra controls 
Geography (distance equator)  -2.45   -  0.10  -0.62  0.04 
 (-2.13)    -  (0.11)  (-0.60)  (0.05) 
Institutions (rule of law)  0.92   -  1.23  0.90  0.69 
  (2.75)    -  (7.98) (4.55) (6.37) 
Neighboring Institutions (rule of law)  0.75   -   -  0.54  0.30 
  (2.69)   -   -  (2.87)  (2.72) 
Market Access (Spatial GDP)   -  0.84  -0.37  -0.41  0.03 
   -  (5.38)  (-2.10)  (-1.97)  (0.13) 
Regional  dummies         
Sub-Saharan Africa   -   -   -   -  -0.19 
   -   -   -   -  (-0.98) 
Latin America + Caribean   -   -   -   -  0.38 
   -   -   -   -  (1.94) 
East-South-East Asia   -   -   -   -  0.13 
   -   -   -   -  (0.67) 
other  Geography         
landlocked   -   -   -   -  -0.49 
   -   -   -   -  (-3.48) 
island   -   -   -   -  -0.04 
   -   -   -   -  (-0.28) 
area   -   -   -   -  -0.03 
   -   -   -   -  (-1.12) 
1st stage 
Instrumented  variable  Institutions  MA  Institutions MA Institutions MA Institutions MA 
%  speaking  european  language  0.70    -  1.04 -0.06 1.04 -0.06 1.27 -0.08 
  (5.48)    -  (5.75) (-0.65) (5.75) (-0.65) (6.30) (-0.92) 
Geography  (distance  equator)  4.01    -  3.18 1.62 3.18 1.62 3.66 1.25 
  (12.72)    -  (6.24) (5.83) (6.24) (5.83) (7.28) (4.48) 
Distance  New  York    -  0.20  0.16 0.24 0.16 0.24 -0.04 0.23 
    -  (2.08)  (1.04) (2.88) (1.04) (2.88) (-0.36) (2.96) 
Distance  Brussels    -  -0.43  -0.16 -0.23 -0.16 -0.23 0.04 -0.23 
    -  (-13.00)  (-2.09) (-6.28) (-2.09) (-6.28) (0.49) (-6.04) 
Distance  Tokyo    -  -0.48  -0.37 -0.31 -0.37 -0.31 0.09 -0.06 
    -  (-4.03)  (-3.18) (-2.97) (-3.18) (-2.97) (0.35) (-0.74) 
            
nr  observations  147  147  147 147 147   19
As a 1
st pass (and certainly not more than that), Table 7 therefore adds market access (MA) to 
our set of explanatory variables where MA of country j is measured as  / ji i j
i
MAG D P D =∑  
with Dij = great circle distance between capital cities of countries i and j. Our measure of 
market access is thus basically a simple market potential function. Redding and Venables 
(2004) construct a similar MA measure and more sophisticated market access measures and 
invariably find that market access is very significant in explaining cross-country differences 
in gdp per capita: a better market access implies a higher gdp per capita. This finding also 
holds when they control for the role of institutions. 
 
The first column in Table 7 again shows our baseline results and the second column illustrates 
that, when looked upon in isolation, market access (MA) has the expected significant positive 
effect on gdp per capita. Following Redding and Venables (2004), MA is instrumented by the 
log distance to three economic centers (New York, Brussels and Tokyo). When we then add 
own-country institutions, see column (3), MA has the wrong sign. This also holds when 
neighboring institutions are added, see column (4). More importantly, the addition of the 
market access variable does not alter our main finding that institutions matter and also that 
neighboring institutions play a role. The last column of Table 7 confirms this. After 
controlling for regional and other fixed geography effects, where the landlocked dummy again 
is significant, (spatial) institutions remain significant and market access is now insignificant 
(but positive).  
 
As to the question why our findings differ from those of Redding and Venables (2004), a 
number of possibilities arise. They do for instance not instrument institutions and only look at 
own country institutions, also their country sample is somewhat smaller (101 countries) to the 
effect that their sample does not include a number of (African) countries with bad institutions. 
Moreover, the focus of their analysis is different. Even though they report estimation results 
for the specification with our simple market access variable and institutions (footnote 15, 
p.65), the bulk of their paper and estimation results deals with market access measures that are 
better grounded in NEG theory. An interesting question for future research would be to look 
more closely at which kind of spatial interdependencies matter most in explaining income 
differences between countries.  
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4.4   Indirect Channels of Influence 
For the spatial variable that is at the center of our analysis, neighboring institutions, one wants 
to learn more about the channels along which the quality of institutions has a good or bad 
impact on neighboring countries. Following suggestions offered by for example Easterly and 
Levine, 1998, Murdoch and Sandler, 2002 and Ades and Chua, 1997 (mentioned more 
explicitly in Section 2 of this paper), Table 8 suggests, by way of first illustration, some 
possible channels of influence.   
 
Table 8 Possible channels of influence for neighboring institutions 
Variable 
Correlation with 
neighboring institutions  Variable 
Correlation with 
neighboring institutions
assasinations  -0.09 [0.37]  prima facie refugees  -0.18 [0.03] 
 109 
(arrivals on a group 
basis)  147 
revolutions/coups  -0.31 [0.00]  refugees per GDP  -0.14 [0.11] 
 129    128 
political instability  -0.25 [0.01]  % arms in total imports -0.07 [0.43] 
 109    132 
external war  -0.31 [0.00]  % workforce in military  0.12 [0.18] 
 147    131 
% government budget  -0.26 [0.01]    
spent on military  97     
Note: p-values in square brackets and # observations on which the correlation is based below the correlation  
coefficient. Correlations in bold are significant. 
 
The general message that Table 8 conveys is that armed conflicts and political turmoil are 
possible channels by which a country might suffer in terms of its gdp per capita because of the 
low quality of institutions in its neighboring countries, thus confirming some of the findings 
in Easterly and Levine, 1998, Ades and Cha, 1997 or Murdoch and Sandler, 2002. Similarly, 
one can envision how inferior institutions in other countries, corrected for distance, negatively 
affect trade and factor mobility. On a more general level, the question why and how 
instrumented spatial institutions and also instrumented own-country institutions have an 
impact on economic development is not answered by the IV-framework on which our analysis 
is based. This is aptly summarized by Rodrik et al. (2004, pp. 153-154) where they state that 
even a powerful instrument is a long cry from a “full theory of cause and effect”.  
 
5.  Summary and Conclusions 
To explain cross-country income differences, economic research has recently focused on the 
so-called deep determinants of economic development, notably institutions and geography. 
This paper sheds a different light on these determinants. We use spatial econometrics to   21
analyse the geography of institutions. Based on a sample of 147 countries, we show that is not 
so much a country’s absolute location, in terms of for instance its climate, but its relative 
location in terms of its institutions that matters for gdp per capita. Apart from a country’s own 
institutions, institutions in neighboring countries turn out to be relevant as well. This finding 
is robust to various alternative specifications in terms of spatial measures, sample size, and 
additional controls including spatial GDP. 
 
Set against the seminal paper by Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004) we conclude that: 
•  1st nature or fixed geography (i.e. distance to the equator) only has an indirect impact 
on gdp per capita in the baseline specification; it is only through institutions (here, rule 
of law) that this version of geography matters. 
•  Institutions are invariably significant in explaining cross-country differences in gdp 
per capita; that is the exogenous variation in institutions as captured by our 
instruments is always significant. 
These two conclusions are in line with Rodrik et al (2004), but by using spatial econometrics 
we also find that  
•  The geography of institutions matters as well. A country’s gdp per capita does not 
only depend on own-country institutions but on the quality of institutions in its 
neighboring countries as well. This is our main result and it shows that economic 
development does not take place in isolation. Moreover, our estimation results indicate 
that by excluding the spatial feature of institutions, studies like Rodrik et al (2004) 
probably overestimate the relevance of own-country institutions and policies.      
•  Moreover, of the control variables included the landlocked variable is significant in all 
specifications. This suggest that 1
st nature geography also plays a role in explaining 
world income differences, as countries without direct access to the sea (and thus the 
world export markets) have a substantially lower level of gdp per capita. 
 
Given the importance that is nowadays attached to good governance by domestic as well as 
international policy makers like the IMF or the World Bank, a policy implication of our 
analysis is that economic development is not only stimulated by improved own-country 
institutions but also by better institutions across the region. Not only the extent and the type of 
institutional change matter, its effectiveness also depends on where it is implemented. In fact, 
good institutions may only be of limited use if a country continues to be surrounded by   22
neighbors with very poor institutions.  This illustrates the relevance of regional development 
policies; of concerted efforts to raise institutional standards in a group of neighboring 
countries at the same time.  As to the future research that our analysis may give rise to, two 
directions come to mind. The first one is to get a better understanding of the transmission 
channels through which neighboring institutions matter (see Table 8 above). The second one 
is to look more closely at alternative measures of spatial interdependency. Instead of focusing 
only on physical distance, one could think of other reasons (e.g. common language, religion 
or history, political or economic alliances) as to why other countries might matter for one’s 
prosperity (see also Simmons and Elkins, 2004). In addition to alternative measures of space 
(physical as opposed to for instance mental or cultural distance), a related avenue for future 
research would be to improve our understanding of the relative importance of the different 
variables through which 2
nd geography matters (e.g. spatial institutions vs. spatial gdp).            23
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Appendix A: Data, definitions and sources 
GDP per capita in 1995 
Purchasing Power Parity basis, from World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2003. For 11 countries with no data 
provided by the World Bank, we used the CIA World Factbook, 1995 or 1996 
Institutions 
Rule of Law index. Refers to 2000 and approximates for 1990’s institutions, from Kaufmann et al. (2005): 
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata/index.html. 
Geography 
Distance from the equator  measured as abs(latitude)/90, from Hall and Jones, 1999: 
http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/chad/HallJones400.asc. 
% speaking European language 
% of the population speaking one of the major languages of Western Europe at birth, i.e. English, French, Spanish, 
Portuguese or German. From Hall and Jones, 1999: http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/chad/HallJones400.asc. 
% speaking English 
% of the population speaking English at birth, from Hall and Jones, 1999: 
http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/chad/HallJones400.asc. 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Dummy variable taking value 1 if a country belongs to Sub-Saharan Africa and 0 otherwise. 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
Dummy variable taking value 1 if a country belongs to Latin America or the Caribbean and 0 otherwise. 
East-South-East Asia 
Dummy variable taking value 1 if a country belongs to East-South-East Asia and 0 otherwise. 
Landlocked 
Dummy variable taking value 1 if a country has no direct access to the sea and 0 otherwise. 
Island 
Dummy variable taking value 1 if a country is an island and 0 otherwise. 
Area 
Land area (in square kilometers), from CEPII: http://www.cepii.fr/distance/geo_cepii.xls. 
Identity Main European Colonizer 
Dummy variables taking the value 1 if a country’s main colonizer was one of the following Western European countries: 
Great Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, The Netherlands, Belgium or Germany and 0 otherwise. From CEPII: 
http://www.cepii.fr/distance/geo_cepii.xls. 
Religion 
Variables measuring the % of the population that belonged to one of the following religions: Buddhism, Hinduism, 
Catholicism, Islam and Protestantism. From Barro, 1996 (for 12 countries we used the CIA World Factbook). 
Distance to Economic Center 
Variables measuring the distance of a country’s capital city to one of the following economic centres: New York (USA), 
Tokyo (Japan) and Brussels (EU). From CEPII: http://www.cepii.fr/distance/geo_cepii.xls. 
GDP in 1995 
Purchasing Power Parity basis, from World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2003. For 11 countries with no data 
provided by the World Bank, we used the CIA World Factbook, 1995 or 1996 
Relative Geography 
Contiguity: A matrix indicating for all country pairs if the two countries are contiguous, 1, or not, 0. From 
http://www.cepii.fr/distance/geo_cepii.xls. 
Distances: A matrix containing the distance between capital (or main) cities for all country pairs. From 
http://www.cepii.fr/distance/geo_cepii.xls. 
Assasinations 
Average number of assasinations per million population over the period, 1960-1990. From Barro and Lee, 1995. 
Revolutions/coups 
Average number of revolutions and coups over the period 1960-1990. From Barro and Lee, 1995. 
Political instability 
From Knack and Keefer, 1995. 
External war 
Dummy variable taking value 1 if a country was involved in at least one external war during the period 1960-1990 and 0 
otherwise. From Barro and Lee, 1995. 
% government budget spent on the military 
Average 1989-1999, from World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2003. 
Prima facie refugees 
Number of refugees granted refugee status on a prima facie/group basis, average 1994-2000. From UNHCR, Statistical 
Yearbook 2003: http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/statistics/. 
Refugees per GDP 
Total number of refugees and person of concern to UNHCR divided by the Gross Domestic Product, average 1994-2000. 
From UNHCR, Statistical Yearbook 2003: http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/statistics/. 
% of arms in total imports 
Average 1989-1999, from World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2003. 
% workforce in the military  
Average 1989-1999, from World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2003.   25
Malaria (MALFAL) 
The percentage of the population at risk of contracting falciparum malaria. From The Earth Institute at Colombia 
University: http://www.earthinstitute.columbia.edu/about/director/malaria/index.html#datasets. 
Malaria ecology 





Appendix B The validity of % speaking European language as an instrument 
As mentioned in the text, Rodrik et al. (2004) decide to use 79 countries as their baseline 
sample. The reason for this is that: 
 
“We … prefer this sample to the 137-country sample because settler mortality appears to be a superior 
instrument to those used in the 137-country sample (ENGFRAC and EURFRAC). … the instruments for the IV 
regressions in the 137-country sample fail to pass the over-identification tests …” (Rodrik et al, 2004, p.143). 
 
This failure of the language instruments to pass the over-identification test also applies to our 
147 country sample. Failure of these two instruments (or any instruments in general) to pass 
these tests sheds considerable doubt on the resulting 2
nd stage estimates when making use of 
these instruments. However not being able to use the 147 country sample would leave us with 
considerable problems (see main text) when trying to estimate the effect of neighboring 
institutions. The solution to the problem that we have resorted to is to use the variable “% of 
the population speaking a European language” as our only instrument. We think we have 
good reasons to believe in the validity of this instrument. Our argument goes as follows: 
1.   Failing to pass the overidentification test does not necessarily mean that both 
instruments are invalid. What is tested is if one instrument is valid given that the other 
instrument is valid. Rejecting the null hypothesis may as well be interpreted as evidence that 
only one of the two instruments is correlated with the 2
nd stage error term. 
2.   How to establish if this is the case? To do this we have come up with the following 
estimation strategy. Ideally we would have liked to have a third (and valid) instrument in case 
of our 147 country sample so that we can test the validity of each of the language instruments 
separately using the over-identification test. We have to admit that we do not have such an 
instrument in our 147 country sample case, however in case of Rodrik et al.’s (2004) baseline 
sample of 79 countries we do have such an instrument, namely the Acemoglu et al. (2001) 
measure of settler mortality. So by restricting ourselves to the 79 country sample, we have 
performed 2SLS estimation using any subset of the three instruments we have at hand in that 
case. 
3.  Table A1 shows the results. The first three columns show the 1
st and 2
nd stage results 
when using only one of the available instruments in the 1
st stage. In that case 
overidentification tests, i.e. tests to establish the uncorrelatedness of the instrument with the 
residuals in the 2
nd stage, cannot be preformed and the only way to establish whether or not an 
instrument is valid is to look at the F-statistic on the instrument in the 1
st stage, i.e. the 
instrument has to be correlated to the institutional quality measure. All three potential 
instruments pass this simple test. So (econometrically speaking) there is no reason to write off 
any of the instruments at this stage (to believe in any of the instruments in this case, relies 
solely on the ‘story’ behind the instrument).   26
Table A1   Results on the instrument validity  
Dependent variable: log GDP per capita in 1995 
  2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Geography  (distance  equator)  -1,43 -2,25 0,80  0,16 -0,41 -1,79 -0,31 
  (-0,94) (-1,35) (1,11)  (0,20) (-0,05) (-1,26) (-0,34) 
Institutions  (rule  of  law)  1,52 1,74 0,93 1,10 1,15 1,61 1,22 
  (5,10) (4,93) (9,83) (9,62) (8,83) (6,27) (8,68) 
         
Hansen J test statistic   -   -   -  10,280  6,633  0,297  12,018 
[p-value]   -   -   -  [0,001]  [0,010]  [0,586]  [0,003] 
Difference  J  statistic           11,721 
[p-value]           [0,000] 
           
1st stage 
Instrumented variable  Institutions Institutions Institutions Institutions Institutions Institutions Institutions
log settler mortality  -0,31   -   -   -  -0,24  -0,26  -0,23 
  (-3,41)   -   -   -  (-2,57)  (-2,57)  (-2,32) 
% speaking European language   -  0,77   -  0,30   -  0,59  0,20 
    - (4,02)   - (1,63)   - (2,91)  (0,96) 
% speaking English   -   -  1,47  1,23  1,25   -  1,11 
   -   -  (5,91)  (4,29)  (5,10)   -  (4,06) 
Geography  (distance  equator)  2,28 3,08 2,88 2,74 1,86 1,99 1,81 
  (2,60) (4,10) (4,12) (3,98) (2,17) (2,31) (2,14) 
         
F-statistic  (instruments)  11,66 16,18 34,90 18,51 23,23 12,98 16,62 
Partial  R-square  0,19 0,16 0,29 0,30 0,39 0,28 0,40 
         
nr  observations  79 79 79 79 79 79 79 
Note: Our sample of 79 differs from Rodrik et al.’s (2004) baseline sample in one aspect. Our sample does not 
include Vietnam because of the unavailability of the language variables, whereas Rodrik et al. (2004) exclude 
the Central African Republic from their baseline sample due to data unavailability reasons. When using the 
whole 147 country sample when settler mortality is not included as instrument, results are very similar to the 79 
country sample. t-values in parentheses. 
 
Next, columns 4-6 show the results when using a combination of two of the three instruments 
in the 1
st stage. Column 4 confirms the finding by Rodrik et al. (2004) in case of their 137 
country sample and our finding in case of our 147 country sample: when including both 
language instruments the overidentification tests are not passed. This also holds when 
including settler mortality and % speaking English as instruments (column 5). However when 
including settler mortality and % speaking a European language (column 6) the 
overidentification test is passed with flying collars (p-value 0.586)
13. As we have noted above 
failing to pass the overidentifaction test can be interpreted as telling you that at least one of 
the instruments is not appropriate. We take the fact that the overidentification test is passed 
when including both settler mortality and % population speaking a European language, but 
not so when any of these two are included in combination with % population speaking 
English, as evidence that this latter instrument is invalid whereas there is no evidence to 
                                                 
13 Also note that the F-statistic on the instruments in the 1
st stage is always significant.   27
believe that % population speaking a European language is not a good instrument.
14 Column 6 
confirms this finding, as when including all three instruments, the overidentification test is 
again not passed. Given the result in column 5 we can also explicitly test for the validity of % 
population speaking English by calculating the difference in the J-statistic between column 6 
and column 5 and comparing this to the χ(1) distribution. This results in rejecting the validity 
of % population speaking English. Note also that the estimated 2
nd stage coefficient on the 
institutional quality measure is always within one standard deviation when using either only 
settler mortality, only % speaking a European language or both of them as instruments, 
whereas the coefficient drops substantially when including also % speaking English. 
 
Combining the above-presented evidence and the need to have an as large as possible sample 
for our purpose of estimating the effect of 2
nd nature geography in the form of neighboring 
institutions (see main text), we have decided to use % population speaking a European 
language as instrument




Appendix C: 2SLS when estimating the effect of neighboring institutions 
The question whether or not to instrument neighboring institutions boils down to whether or 
not this measure can be expected to be correlated to the error term, see (5). As mentioned in 
the main text there are three main reasons why this could be the case, and here we will briefly 
comment on each of these. 
1.  Reverse causality 
Can we expect that neighboring institutions are also directly influenced by one’s own level of 
GDP per capita, i.e.  , 0 ii i WI n s t y ς υς =+ ≠ ? If this would be the case the need to 
instrument would immediately be established. However a direct effect of one’s own level of 
GDP per capita on the institutions in one’s neighboring countries may not be that convincing, 
although not unthinkable either. Still even if this ‘direct’ form of reverse causality would not 
be an issue, it is still true that it is likely that one’s own level of GDP per capita affects the 
institutional quality in one’s own country (one of the reasons to instrument own institutions),  
,0 ii i Inst y ς υς =+ ≠         ( A C 1 )  
If true, this will result in a correlation between neighboring countries’ institutions  
and the error term ε, establishing the need for instrumentation of neighboring institutions. To 
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and remembering the assumption of exogeneity of the geography measure, Geo, that the 
measure of neighboring institutions will be correlated to the 2
nd stage error term ε if
16, 
                                                 
14 Note also that when one takes the validity of settler mortality as instrument for granted (as Rodrik et al. (2004) 
for example do), the results of the Hansen J-test when including both settler mortality and % speaking a 
European language can be interpreted as a direct test (which is accepted) of the relevance of the latter. 
15 Also note that the results for the 79 country sample (Table A1, column 2) and the 147 country sample (Table 
3, column 5) in the main text are quite similar. 
16 Note that the condition in (AC3) also assumes that the effects of own institutions, γ, and neighboring 
institutions, λ, are not equal to zero.   28
      { } (( )' ) 0 1,2,3,...
k E W for atleastonek εε≠∈          (AC3) 
For k = 1, this will be the case if random shocks to GDP per capita are spatially correlated 
among neighbors. We think one can expect this to be the case, think of for example shocks 
due to reasons of climate, which thus already suggests the need to instrument spatial 
institutions. This need is even more clearly established by noting that for values of k > 1, 
condition (AC3) will always be true as those terms involve the variance of ε which is clearly 
not equal to zero (in the case of for example k = 2, the term in (AC3) will represent the 
correlation of a country’s own shock with the shock to that country’s neighbors’ neighbors, 
which clearly includes the country’s own shock). 
2.  Measurement error 
Can we expect our institutional variable to be measured with error, i.e. 
()
TRUE
ii i WI n s t WI n s t ν =+         ( A C 4 )  
If so the need to instrument would be evident and not instrumenting would result (given the 
fact that the coefficient is positive when using OLS, see Table 3) in a downward bias. One 
can, however, also argue that the measurement error is completely due to mismeasuring the 
institutional quality, Inst, and not so much the spatial structure, W. If this is the case, 
measurement error in the institutional variable has its effect on the neighboring institutional 
measure only through, Inst, i.e. (AC4) becomes: 
 () ( )
TRUE
ii i i i WI n s t W I n s t WI n s t W ν ν =+ = +       ( A C 5 )  
Although only subtly different from the case in (AC4) this type of measurement error is in our 
view even more likely to be present (see Acemoglu, et al. (2001), who view (based on the 
difference in the estimated parameter of institutions when using OLS or 2SLS) measurement 
error in own institutions as the main source of endogeneity). It is straightforward to show that, 
as in the case of (AC4), this type of measurement error leads to a downward bias in the 
estimated coefficient when simply using OLS. Hereby establishing, in our view even more 
firmly than in the case of reverse causality, the need to instrument neighboring institutions. 
3.  Omitted variables 
If we expect the presence of an omitted variable that explains GDP per capita and that is 
correlated to our measure of institutional quality, the need to instrument would immediately 
be present. This is clearly not unthinkable in the case of neighboring institutions. Instead of 
instrumenting, however, one would much rather include the important omitted variable in the 
regression. The latter is what is done in the numerous robustness checks provided in the main 
text. But, of course, one cannot include variables in these robustness checks for which no data 
is available. So instrumenting neighboring institutions on the basis of omitted variable bias is 
also a valid reason, maybe not that a convincing reason though as omitted variable bias can be 
argued to be a problem in any empirical study (and clearly IV-estimation is not so common in 
many studies). 
 
Given that we need to instrument, we will now show that neighboring ‘fitted institutions’ 
constructed by multiplying ‘fitted institutions’ obtained from the first stage, (2-i), by the 
spatial weight matrix, W, is a valid way to solve the endogeneity problems involved in the 
neighboring institutions variable. For ease of exposition we will show this for the following 
case (in vector notation)
17: 
 
                                                 
17 The result is easily extended to including also X, the endogenous variable in nonspatial form, and/or other 
endogenous/exogenous variables. One can also generalise the result regarding the variance and allow for 









           ( A C 6 )  
where Y is the dependent variable, WX is a spatial measure based on spatial weight matrix W 
and variable X, and to solve possible endogeneity problems X is instrumented by the 
instrumental variable Z. It is assumed that Z is a valid instrument, i.e.  0 ( ' ) 0 and E Z β ε ≠ = , 
and that  ( ' ) 0 EZη = . The fitted values of X obtained from the first stage, (AC6-i) are 
 
1 ˆ (') ' X ZZZ ZX
− =           ( A C 7 )  
substituting this for X in the 2
nd stage (AC6-ii) and doing the regression gives the following 
estimate of α: 
1 ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ('' ) '' X WW X XWY α
− =          ( A C 8 )  
Is this estimate unbiased, i.e. is  ˆ () E α α = ? This can be checked rewriting (AC8) by first 
substituting (AC6-ii) for and Y and adding and substracting  ˆ WX α : 
 
1 ˆˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ('' ) '' ( ) X WW X XW W X W X W X αα ε α α
− =+ + −       ( A C 9 )  
which simplifies to 
11 ˆˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ' ')' '( ' ')' '( ) X WW X XW XWW X XW WX X αα ε α
−− =+ + −     (AC10) 
Next rewrite  ˆ () X X −  using (AC7) and (AC6-ii) to get: 
11 1 ˆˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ('' ) '' ('' ) '' ( (' ) ' ) XWW X XW XWW X XW WI ZZZ Z α αεα η
−− − =+ + −  (AC11) 
Now it can be established, by substituting (AC7) for ˆ X , taking the expectation, and using the 
assumptions that  ( ' ) 0 EZε =  and  ( ' ) 0 EZη = , that: 
 
ˆ () E α α =            ( A C 1 2 )  
  
Having established the unbiasedness of the estimated parameter,  ˆ α , we are also interested in 
the accuracy of the estimated parameter,  ˆ () Var α ? Using (AC11) and denoting 
1 ˆˆ ˆ ('' ) '' PX W W XX W
− =  and 
11 ˆˆ ˆ ('' ) ''( (' ) ' ) R XWW X XWWI ZZZ Z
−− =−  it can be shown 
that: 
 
21 2 2 ˆˆ ˆ () ( ' ' ) '2 ' Var X W WX RR PR εη ε η ασ α σ α σ






η σ  is the variance of ε ,η respectively and εη σ  the covariance betweenε  and η . 
(AC13) can be estimated consistently by substituting 
2 ˆε σ ,




η σ , εη σ  and 
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